Maryland Journal of International Law
Volume 30
Issue 1 Symposium: "Investor-State Disputes"

Article 6

The Impact of Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital,
Ltd.: Why the Supreme Court’s Ruling Against
Argentina Avoided a Host of Unintended, Negative
Consequences
Ellen Ginsberg Simon
Q. Monty Crawford

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil
Part of the International Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Ellen G. Simon, & Q. M. Crawford, The Impact of Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd.: Why the Supreme Court’s Ruling Against
Argentina Avoided a Host of Unintended, Negative Consequences, 30 Md. J. Int'l L. 55 (2015).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil/vol30/iss1/6

This Articles & Essays is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Maryland Journal of International Law by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information,
please contact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.

05 - CRAWFORDSIMON (DO NOT DELETE)

5/6/2015 10:47 AM

ARTICLE

The Impact of Republic of Argentina v. NML
Capital, Ltd.: Why the Supreme Court’s
Ruling Against Argentina Avoided a Host of
Unintended, Negative Consequences
ELLEN GINSBERG SIMON† AND Q. MONTY CRAWFORD,††

“How much easier it is to be critical than to be correct.”1
I.

INTRODUCTION

Concern over and criticism of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, LTD.2 has focused on fears
that more creditors will be persuaded to hold out against bond
restructuring deals in the future, successful debt exchanges will be
more difficult to coordinate, and other restructuring efforts will end
up similarly mired in litigation. Detractors of the decision fail to
† Ms. Simon is an Associate in the Baltimore office of DLA Piper LLP (US).
Ms. Simon holds an A.B. from Brown University, an M.Phil. from the University
of Oxford, and a J.D. from Harvard Law School. The views set forth herein are the
personal views of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the law firm
with which she is associated.
†† Mr. Crawford is a Partner in the Baltimore office of DLA Piper LLP (US).
Mr. Crawford holds a B.A. from Bucknell University and a J.D. from the
University of Chicago. The views set forth herein are the personal views of the
author and do not necessarily reflect those of the law firm with which he is
associated.
1. 156 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) (1860) 75-116 (U.K.) (statement of
Benjamin Disraeli).
2
573 U.S. ___ (2014).
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consider, however, the myriad negative consequences had the
Supreme Court ruled otherwise and read into the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act (“FSIA”) a nonexistent provision immunizing
sovereigns from post-judgment discovery. Critics of the decision
deflect attention from the actual ruling, which was limited in scope to
a highly specific question of statutory interpretation: whether the
FSIA immunizes a foreign-sovereign judgment debtor from postjudgment discovery of information concerning its extraterritorial
assets. Instead, these critics substitute the Second Circuit’s and the
District Court for the Southern District of New York’s findings that
Argentina violated the pari passu clause and must make ratable
payments to the minority holdout creditors, ignoring the actual
content of the Supreme Court’s circumscribed decision.
The case was not a referendum on sovereign debt restructuring
and its appropriate mechanisms. Concern about the potential
ramifications of the Second Circuit’s ruling on sovereign debt
restructuring is not sufficient reason to disregard the actual question
before the Supreme Court, which comes attendant with its own
ramifications in the world of judgment enforcement. One must
consider the alternative, negative consequences of such a ruling when
passing judgment.
These unintended, negative consequences
similarly would have threatened investor-state relations and parties’
abilities to reasonably rely on the enforceability of judgments in
international arbitration and cross-border litigation. While concerns
about the deleterious effect of the District Court’s decisions may be
valid, resolution of those apprehensions belongs to a different, more
appropriate arena.
This essay first explores the reasons the Supreme Court
correctly interpreted the FSIA.
It examines the negative
consequences of an alternative ruling, including the implications of a
contrary decision on the ability to enforce judgments against
international “bad actors” and the deleterious effect on international
commerce. It concludes with a review of more appropriate methods
of addressing the problem of sovereign defaults proposed by several
international financial organizations in the wake of the decision.
II.

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

The case originally stems from Argentina’s 2001 default on
more than $80 billion in bonds.3 Over more than a decade later and
3. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina (Equal Treatment Case I), 699
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after negotiating two debt exchanges in 2005 and 2010, Argentina
had restructured its debt with approximately 91 percent of its
creditors.4 One of the remaining holdout creditors was NML Capital,
Ltd., a U.S. hedge fund associated with Elliott Associates that
speculates in distressed debt. Unable to reach a settlement, NML
Capital brought 11 actions against Argentina in the Southern District
of New York to collect on the defaulted bonds, alleging breach of
contract and seeking injunctive relief. 5 Jurisdiction was based on
Argentina’s broad waiver of sovereign immunity in the bond
indenture agreements. NML Capital was successful in each action,
and it sought to execute its judgments against Argentina. This
resulted in protracted litigation and multiple appeals to the Second
Circuit.6
On December 7, 2011, Judge Thomas Griesa ruled that
Argentina breached the pari passu clause of its bond agreements by
“relegating NML’s bonds to a non-paying class.”7 On February 23,
2012, Judge Griesa granted injunctive relief to NML Capital, holding
that Argentina violated the pari passu clause in its original bonds by
its refusal to pay holdout creditors, by enacting laws impeding
settlement, and by making official statements of defiance. 8 Judge
Griesa required Argentina to pay both the old and new bonds ratably,
obligating Argentina to pay NML Capital and its co-plaintiffs full
principal and past-due interest whenever it makes its periodic coupon
payment on the restructured bonds. 9 Argentina was enjoined from
paying the restructured debt holders without also paying the holdouts
who demand full payment plus interest. 10 The order also threatened
to sanction third parties, including exchange bondholders and
F.3d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 2012); CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS
TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY 10, 12 (2009).
4. Equal Treatment Case I, 699 F.3d at 252–53.
5. Id. at 253.
6. Emma Kingdon, Leveraging Litigation: Enforcing Sovereign Debt
Obligations in NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 37 B.C. INT’L & COMP.
L. REV. 30, 30–31 (2014); REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 3.
7. Order, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, ____(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7,
2011) (No. 08 Civ. 6978), 2011 WL 9522565, at *2.
8. Order, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 08 Civ. 6978
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2012) [hereinafter Feb. 23, 2012 Order]; Equal Treatment Case
I, 699 F.3d at 254–55 (internal citations omitted).
9. Feb. 23, 2012 Order, supra note 8.
10. Id. While affirming, the Second Circuit remanded the case for greater
clarification of the terms of the injunction, and Judge Griesa provided clarification
regarding the injunction in a subsequent opinion. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of
Argentina, 699 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2012), on remand, 2012 WL 5895786 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 21, 2012) (stayed by the Second Circuit on Nov. 28, 2012).
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financial institutions both domestic and abroad, that might try to help
Argentina pay the debt and prohibited Argentina from rerouting
payments on the new bonds. 11
On October 26, 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit unanimously upheld Judge Griesa’s finding that Argentina
violated the pari passu clause and should make ratable payments,
rejecting the U.S. government’s argument that the order would
obstruct future attempts at debt restructurings and violated the
FSIA. 12 On August 23, 2013, the Second Circuit affirmed Judge
Griesa’s formula for ratable payment, refusing to limit the territorial
reach of Judge Griesa’s injunction.13
Argentina appealed the decision to the Supreme Court in June
2013, seeking review both on the substantive holding of the lower
courts’ order requiring it to make ratable payments to the holdout
creditors and on whether the District Court’s order violated the FSIA
by permitting postjudgment discovery on third parties regarding
Argentina’s extraterritorial assets. While declining to review the
former issue, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the latter
question. 14 On June 16, 2014, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of
NML Capital on the issue of postjudgment discovery. 15
III. THE POTENTIAL UNINTENDED NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF AN
ALTERNATIVE DECISION
A.

The Supreme Court Correctly Interpreted the FSIA

When divorced from the hype and rhetoric surrounding this case
about the disproportionate power of so-called “vulture funds”
threatening to derail future restructurings and taking advantage of
debt crises at the expense of all other creditors willing to negotiate a
debt exchange, the Supreme Court’s ruling was a simple matter of
statutory interpretation of a much more limited topic. It was a
straightforward determination that the FSIA contains no provision to
immunize foreign-sovereign judgment debtors from post-judgment
discovery of information concerning their extraterritorial assets. In
11. Id. (internal citations omitted).
12. Equal Treatment Case I, 699 F.3d at 265.
13. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina (Equal Treatment Case II), 727
F.3d 230, 237 (2d Cir. 2013).
14. See Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014).
15. See Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2250, 2254
(2014).
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this limited context, Justice Scalia’s opinion typifies a clean, strict
reading of the statute, noting that, “the question. . .is not what
Congress ‘would have wanted’ but what Congress enacted in the
FSIA.”16 Analyzing the relevant statutory language, the opinion
reviews the two immunity-conferring provisions it contains, which:
(1) allow foreign states immunity from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts
(which, the Court notes, Argentina waived and thus is “liable in the
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances”); and (2) provide that “the property in the United
States of a foreign state shall be immune from attachment[,] arrest[,]
and execution except as provided in sections 1610 and 1611 of this
chapter.”17 The Court concludes that “[t]here is no third provision
forbidding or limiting discovery in aid of execution of a foreignsovereign judgment debtor’s assets” and declines to “draw meaning”
from this silence by reading absolute immunity from execution to
equate with immunity from discovery in aid of execution. 18
Acknowledging that the creditors ultimately may not be able to
execute the judgment against certain properties, Justice Scalia points
out “that NML does not yet know what property Argentina has and
where it is, let alone whether it is executable under the relevant
jurisdiction’s law.”19
Similar to many detractors of the opinion who worried about the
policy implications for future sovereign debt restructurings,
Argentina based its claim of immunity from post-judgment discovery
largely on extra-legal arguments with which the U.S. Government
concurred in its amicus brief.
These arguments related to
international comity, the impact on international relations, and fears
of reciprocal adverse treatment of the United States in foreign
courts.20 They implicated concerns that “a United States court’s
allowance of unduly broad discovery concerning a foreign state’s
assets may cause the United States to be subjected to similar
treatment abroad.”21
The U.S. Government highlighted its concern about the
implications on foreign relations should a foreign state’s property “be
16. Id. at 2258 (citing Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2160
(1992)).
17. Id. at 2256 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(a)(1), 1606, 1609 (2011)).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae On Petition,
Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014) (No. 12-842).
21. Id. at 11.
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the subject of broad-ranging discovery, regardless of whether that
property could be subject to execution in the United States.” 22 In
further attempting to argue that the FSIA supports its position,
Argentina, echoed by the U.S. Government, conflated the concepts of
the scope of discovery with the scope of attachment and execution
under the statute. In their desire to promote their policy objectives,
they failed to distinguish these two, distinct issues, promoted a
distorted reading of the FSIA, disregarded legislative history and
amendments to the statute that support Justice Scalia’s understanding,
and endorsed a changed understanding of the statute that would have
resulted in more realistic and ultimately destructive policy
implications.
One of the central purposes of the FSIA is to ensure that the
judicial system holds sovereign states accountable for their
commercial activities. The FSIA states this purpose in no uncertain
terms: “states are not immune from the jurisdiction of foreign courts
insofar as their commercial activities are concerned, and their
commercial property may be levied upon for the satisfaction of
judgments rendered against them in connection with their commercial
activities.”23 The FSIA is based on and codifies the U.S.’s longstanding restrictive theory of immunity, which holds that public acts
(jure imperii) of sovereign states are entitled to immunity while
states’ private conduct and commercial acts (jure gestionis) are not.24
Under the restrictive theory of immunity, states that subject
themselves to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts through their commercial
endeavors (as did Argentina through its own bond contract
provisions) submit to normal judicial processes, including the
discovery rules in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In addition,
numerous foreign jurisdictions also have codified this long-standing
distinction for the purposes of immunity.25
Argentina’s
understanding of the statute would have undermined a significant
22. Id. at 19.
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2014).
24. This theory has its earliest roots in The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, in
which Justice Marshall, while adopting a broad form of state immunity at the time,
also laid the foundational seeds for the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in
his discussion of the distinction between armed public vessels such as the one in
question and private merchant ships doing trade with the United States. 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 116 (1812). Thus, common law support for the distinction between the
public acts of states as compared to commercial acts is centuries old.
25. Draft Articles on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property,
1991 (United Nations 2005), available at http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/
english/draft%20articles/4_1_1991.pdf; see also European Convention on State
Immunity, May 16, 1972, ETS 74.
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U.S. interest, enshrined in the statute itself, in enhancing the
effectiveness of U.S. court judgments and the ability of parties to
enforce those judgments abroad, while simultaneously upending
traditional interpretation of the FSIA as well as centuries of common
law and customary international law.
Instead of hindering comity and reciprocity, the Supreme
Court’s decision promotes these two worthwhile ends in several
ways. First, it supports the restrictive theory of immunity which
enhances global commerce and champions the rule of law in
international relations and the integrity of our court’s judgments to
which Argentina contractually bound itself.26 Enforcement of valid
judgments and encouraging respect for judgments emanating from
U.S. courts is, in itself, a fundamental foreign relations interest. 27
Foreign sovereigns have no reasonable expectation of immunity
under either the FSIA or international legal principles when they
voluntarily enter the commercial arena. States also have a reasonable
expectation of the need to submit to the normal course of the judicial
process (including discovery) once a court has jurisdiction either
pursuant to immunity exceptions such as waiver or the commercial
activity doctrine. 28 Upsetting those reasonable expectations would, in
26. See Complaint at Exhibit A, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. 08 CIV 6978) (explaining that the waiver provision
establishes the State of New York as the jurisdiction with venue over any disputes
arising out of the agreement, stating in pertinent part, “The Republic hereby
irrevocably and unconditionally waives, to the fullest extent permitted by law, any
objection which it may now or hereafter have to the laying of venue of any
aforesaid action arising out of or in connection with this Agreement brought in any
such court has been brought in an inconvenient forum. . .The Republic hereby
irrevocably waives and agrees not to plead any immunity from the jurisdiction of
any such court to which it might otherwise be entitled in any action arising out of
or based on the Securities or this Agreement by the holder of any Security.”).
27. Brief of Competitive Enterprise Institute & Former State Department
Officials as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Republic of Argentina v. NML
Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014) (No. 12-842).
28. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure possess adequate remedies to
overcome any potential problems related to comity or reciprocity that arise in
attempts to conduct post-judgment discovery, including the foreign sovereign’s
ability to object on grounds of relevance or burdensomeness available to any other
judgment debtor. Courts can also weigh the risks of and foreign state’s interest in
potential disclosure of sensitive information. As Justice Scalia suggests in footnote
6 of the opinion, any attempted discovery related to property that is per se exempt
under international law from either attachment or execution or pursuant to treaty
obligations that might pose a comity or reciprocity problem could be handled
according to “settled doctrines of privilege and the discretionary determination by
the district court whether the discovery is warranted, which may appropriately
consider comity interests and the burden that the discovery might cause to the
foreign state.” NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. at 2258 n.6 (quoting Societe Nationale
Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Court for Southern Dist. Of Iowa,
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fact, have upset principles of international comity by undermining the
validity of judicial decisions in cross-border litigation and by
threatening litigants’ ability to rely on judgments rendered in such
cases. Argentina’s perversion of the FSIA’s plain language and
content would have undermined the United States’ vital national
interests in the rule of law, enforcement of valid judgments against
foreign states, and respect for the U.S. judicial system.
B.

A Contrary Decision Would Have Been A Boon For
International Bad Actors

A decision barring post-judgment discovery based on sovereign
immunity likely would immunize a number of bad actors in the
international sphere from post-judgment discovery. Such a decision
would have imposed yet one more roadblock to the enforcement of
many outstanding judgments against recalcitrant, uncooperative, and
hostile nations, rogue states, and terrorist groups.29
Litigants with judgments against Iran, Syria, the Russian
Federation, and other states from which they seek to recover damages
would have faced yet one more hurdle in an already difficult struggle
to enforce judgments. These states possess few if any attachable
assets in the U.S. as a consequence of U.S. sanctions laws. They also
commonly and intentionally hide their assets in complex structures
overseas. Furthermore, they typically show contempt for U.S.
discovery orders, refusing to recognize the U.S. court’s authority and
to comply with any such orders.
Such actors, which already have numerous unenforced
judgments against them for their roles in terrorist attacks or in the
illegal seizure of property, would have scored yet another victory and
would have been given another tool to resist the enforcement of U.S.
court judgments. Many of the U.S. citizens who struggled for years
to obtain judgments against states found liable for the deaths of their
relatives or for illegal seizures of their property would lack the
resources of an entity such as NML Capital to enforce those
judgments if they were stripped of normal avenues of discovery to
locate unidentified, attachable assets.
482 U.S. 522, 543–44 n.28 (1987)).
29. See generally, Brief for Family Members and Estates of Victims of StateSponsored Terrorism as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Republic of
Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014) (No. 12-842); see also
Brief Amicus Curiae of Agudas Chasidei Chabad of United States in Support of
Respondent, Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014)
(No. 12-842).
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This includes, for example, Agudas Chasidei Chabad of United
States, which, after suing the Russian Federation and several Russian
agencies under the FSIA, obtained a judgment to recover Chabad’s
library that was seized in violation of international law during the
October Revolution of 1917. 30 Having obtained a default judgment
and, later, a contempt sanction against the Russian Federation after it
withdrew from the litigation claiming the court lacked jurisdiction,
Chabad now seeks to enforce the judgment and contempt sanction. 31
This will require it to conduct discovery in the U.S. and abroad to
locate attachable assets. Had the Supreme Court decided in
Argentina’s favor, Chabad and similarly situated litigants’ ability to
conduct discovery would have been severely hampered and the
injunctive order rendered useless.32 That result would have been
highly damaging to the value, respect, and dignity of the U.S. judicial
system.
Similarly, several families of victims of state-sponsored terrorist
attacks are seeking or already have been awarded judgments in U.S.
courts. This includes the families of victims of the September 11,
2001 attacks on the U.S., who are suing the Sudan for its role in
funding al Qaeda. 33 Family members of Americans killed in the 1998
U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania already have
obtained judgments against the Sudan and Iran for their role in
supporting the responsible terrorists. 34 One family was awarded $38
million in compensatory damages and $300 million in punitive
damages against the Kurdistan Worker’s Party for its abduction of the
late Ronald Wyatt.35 A district court in Illinois issued a judgment for
$32 million in compensatory and $35 million in punitive damages
against Iran for its support of Palestinian Islamic Jihad, which
perpetrated a terrorist attack on the Leibovitch family in 2003
resulting in the murder of their child. 36 Argentina’s proposed
30. Brief Amicus Curiae of Agudas Chasidei Chabad of United States in
Support of Respondent, Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct.
2819 (2014) (No. 12-842).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Brief for Family Members and Estates of Victims of State-Sponsored
Terrorism as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 1, Republic of Argentina v.
NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014) (No. 12-842) [hereinafter Brief for
Family Members].
34. Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 826 F. Supp. 2d 128, 157 (D.D.C. 2011); see
also Brief for Family Members, supra note 33, at 2.
35. Wyatt v. Syrian Arab Republic, 908 F. Supp. 2d 216, 220–21 (D.D.C.
2012); see also Brief for Family Members, supra note 33, at 2.
36. Leibovitch v. Syrian Arab Republic, 2011 WL 444762 at *4–5 (N.D. Ill.
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interpretation of the FSIA would have constrained these plaintiffs’
abilities to enforce valid judgments against international bad actors,
undermining the value of U.S. court judgments and the integrity of
our judicial system.
Such an outcome, moreover, would have contravened Congress’
repeatedly affirmed intention of using the FSIA as a vehicle to hold
terrorist-sponsoring states accountable for their crimes and to assist
the victims of state-sponsored terrorism in their efforts to obtain
justice. 37 Congress repeatedly has amended the FSIA to support the
enforcement of judgments against state sponsors of terrorism, going
so far as to permit the attachment of diplomatic property and frozen
assets in some circumstances, although presidential authority to
waive attachment under this provision based on national security
concerns has frustrated attempts to enforce it.38 Congress has
instructed executive officials to assist terrorist victims in their efforts
to locate attachable assets.39 Congress also passed the Victims of
Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 40 to require
liquidation of Cuban foreign assets to satisfy judgments and the
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) of 200241 to limit the
president’s ability to waive attachment of diplomatic property and
frozen assets.42 Contrary to Argentina’s reading of the FSIA and its
2011); see also Brief for Family Members, supra note 33, at 2–3.
37. Brief for Family Members, supra note 33, at 2–3; see also 28 U.S.C. §
1610(f)(1)(A).
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(f)(1)(A); see, e.g., John R. Crook, U.S. Supreme Court
Finds President’s Waiver of Terrorism Exception to Iraq’s Sovereign Immunity
Bars Pending Cases, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 582, 583 (2009).
39. See 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (f)(2)(A).
40. 22 U.S.C. § 7101.
41. 28 U.S.C. § 1610.
42. See Brief for Family Members and Estates of Victims of State-Sponsored
Terrorism as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 16-17, Republic of Argentina
v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014) (No. 12-842); see also Victims of
Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.106-386, § 2002, 114
Stat. 1464, 1541 (Oct. 28, 2000); 28 U.S.C. § 1610 Note.
For a detailed discussion of the history leading to the enactment of these statutes,
see generally In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorist Litigation, 659 F.Supp.2d 31
(D.D.C. 2009). Victims have had limited success in attempts to invoke the relevant
provisions of these acts, with several failing to obtain relief under the Terrorism
Risk Insurance Act because the court found they waived their rights to attachment
through acceptance of a pro rata compensation payment under the Victims of
Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000. Nonetheless, the relevant
provisions of the statutes have been acknowledged and applied by courts and
continue to remain good law. For recent examples of application and interpretation
of these statutes, see, e.g., Ministry of Defense & Support for the Armed Forces of
the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Elahi, 556 U.S. 366 (S. Ct. 2009); Cruz v. Maypa,
2014 WL 6734848 (4th Cir. 2014); Hegna v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 402 F.3d 97
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intent, time and again Congress has spoken unequivocally in favor of
supporting the location of attachable assets while never limiting the
means by which victims could conduct discovery to do so.
C.

A Contrary Decision Would Have Hindered International Trade
and Commerce

Rather than promoting foreign investment, a decision contrary to
that reached by the Court would have hindered the international
marketplace. Investors, states, and markets require the predictability
of the application of the rule of law. Reinterpreting statutes such as
the FSIA to support the shirking of commercial contractual
obligations entered into by sovereign states and to deny the
application of basic discovery rules undermines that predictability.
Rather than undermining the United States’ comity and reciprocity
interests, as argued by Argentina and the U.S. Government, the
Court’s decision to uphold investors’ ability to conduct discovery in
aid of judgment promotes those interests by encouraging states to
stand by their commercial obligations and upholding a fundamental
tenet of international law – the principle of pacta sunt servanda.43
The U.S. has a significant interest in promoting other countries’
adherence to their self-imposed, commercial contractual obligations
and other international agreements. A state that proactively markets
its bonds in the U.S. and then defaults on those bonds directly harms
U.S. citizens. Its default further harms its own citizens by raising the
cost of their country’s debt. Beyond the economic impact on these
two populations is the overarching negative impact on commerce
caused by a sovereign’s apparent ability to disregard its contractual
obligations when faced with internal instability. The message a
contrary decision would have sent was to condone the overthrow of
contractual provisions freely entered into by a sovereign entity as an
easy solution to ineffective internal economic policies. Domingo
Cavallo, Argentina’s former minister of the economy who oversaw
its 2001 debt restructuring, has publicly criticized how current
Argentine President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner handled the
country’s latest debt crisis and has advised compliance with Judge
Griesa’s order.44 Instead of blaming vulture funds and a U.S. District
(2nd Cir. 2005).
43. PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 70–71 (7th ed. 2006) (“treaties must be adhered to”).
44. See Landon Thomas Jr., Argentine Economist Says Bond Holdouts Should
Be Paid, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2014, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/09/03/
argentine-economic-figure-urges-payments-to-bond-holdouts/?_r=0.
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Court, Mr. Cavallo suggested that President Kirchner or a new
government employ more responsible policies internally to stabilize
the Argentine economy, stem capital flight, and use the returned
capital to pay its investors.45 Mr. Cavallo further recommended that,
instead of attacking the U.S. judicial system, the international
community and the IMF need to revisit establishing a bankruptcy
regime or mechanism for defaulting sovereigns. 46
Denying basic application of discovery rules would have proven
restrictive of the marketplace, discouraging investors from taking a
risk on investing in states that might easily turn around and invoke
sovereign immunity to shirk their contractual obligations. Denying
discovery to plaintiffs would make international investment and debt
purchases less attractive, more risky, and more expensive by
alienating risk-averse investors and resulting in higher interest rates
for the country’s own citizens. This outcome would neither have
served Argentina’s long-term interests nor those of more responsible
states seeking to attract investors. Congress expressly designed the
FSIA to protect the rights of holders of foreign sovereign debt by
indicating that bond sales should be treated like other similar
commercial transactions to avoid a situation in which a foreign state
can shift the “burdens of the marketplace onto the shoulders of
private parties.”47 If investors have no recourse to discover the
foreign assets of and attempt to recover against governments that
shirk their commercial obligations, what security will they have in
making investments in the first place? Put simply – if you cannot
rely on or predict the rules of the game, you are less likely to play it.
Congress cannot have intended for the FSIA to promote such a
backward outcome.
IV. CONCERNS ABOUT THE IMPACT OF THE LOWER COURTS’ RULINGS
CAN AND SHOULD BE ADDRESSED IN MORE APPROPRIATE FORA
International organizations, foreign governments, and even the
U.S. government expressed concern about the far-reaching
implications of Judge Thomas Griesa’s order enjoining Argentina
from making payments on its restructured 2005 and 2010 debt
without making ratable payments to holdout creditors including NML
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Judicial Education Project and Professors of
Law in Support of Respondent, Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S.
Ct. 2819 (2014) (No. 12-842).
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Capital, Ltd., the so-called “vulture fund” that rejected the
restructuring deal. 48 The decision has been heralded as a triumph for
the “vulture fund” – a litigious minority – at the expense of the 93
percent majority of creditors who accepted restructuring.
Arguably, the bargaining power of potential holdouts has
increased, while creditors contemplating an exchange offer must now
also consider not only an expected reduction in their investment but
also face the possibility of costly and protracted litigation by such
emboldened holdouts.49 Such a result could doom future exchange
offers to failure. The reduction in financial incentives for creditors to
join orderly debt restructurings may make such deals increasingly
difficult to negotiate, especially in the case of the many outstanding
bonds that currently have no collective action clauses (“CACs”).50
Some have argued that the decision upends a traditional reading of
the pari passu clause, threatens common understandings of
restructuring techniques in practice for nearly a century, and bodes
poorly for future attempts at sovereign debt restructuring. 51 The
decision has been described by experts in the field as having “shaken
the sovereign universe,” with consequences that “spell the End of the
World for sovereign immunity [and] sovereign debt as we know it.”52
Columbia University economist Joseph E. Stiglitz has likened the
situation to “America throwing a bomb into the global economic
system,” noting that the problem extends beyond Argentina. 53
These concerns may well be valid and potent, but the context of
the narrow, discovery-related question before the Supreme Court was
not the appropriate forum for their consideration or resolution.
Organizations from the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) to the
International Capital Market Association (“ICMA”) have responded
48. Feb. 23, 2012 Order, supra note 8.
49. Lee C. Buchheit et al., Revisiting Sovereign Bankruptcy, Committee on
International Economic Policy and Reform, BROOKINGS INST., Oct. 2013, at 18.
50. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, June 24, 2014,
Argentina’s ‘vulture fund’ crisis threatens profound consequences for international
financial system,
http://unctad.org/en/pages/newsdetails.aspx?OriginalVersionID=783&Sitemap_x00
20_Taxonomy=UNCTAD%20Home.
51. Mark C. Weidemaier, Sovereign Debt After NML v. Argentina, 8 CAP.
MKTS. L.J. 123, 125 (2013).
52. Anna Gelpern, Known Unknowns in Pari Passu. . .and More to Come,
CREDIT
SLIPS:
A DISCUSSION ON CREDIT, FINANCE, AND BANKRUPTCY
(Oct. 28, 2012), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2012/10/unknownunknowns-in-pari-passu-and-more-to-come.html.
53. Peter Eavis & Alexandra Stevenson, Argentina Finds Relentless Foe in
Paul Singer’s Hedge Fund, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2014.
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by looking anew at contractual remedies, changed lending policies,
and concepts such as a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism to
address the increasing problem of sovereign defaults in an
international system that lacks a sovereign bankruptcy regime. In
December 2013 and in June 2014, the ICMA, a group that represents
banks, lawyers, brokers and issuers in 53 countries, published a paper
and a supplement recommending new terms for sovereign bonds in
order to reduce the risk of future restructurings being held hostage by
minority holdout creditors, as occurred in the case of Argentina, and
to promote a more stable bond market. 54 The ICMA paper suggests
modifying a typical pari passu clause to ensure that it explicitly states
that holdout creditors cannot expect guaranteed payment. The IMF,
too, has taken up this gauntlet, publishing papers on recent
developments in sovereign debt restructuring and suggesting actions
to address attendant problems.55 The IMF’s October 2014 paper, a
self-described response to the case of Argentina and the Southern
District of New York’s decisions which included input from the
ICMA among others, recommends modification of the pari passu
clause “in a manner that ensures that the type of remedy provided to
holdout creditors in the case of Argentina would not be replicated in
future cases.”56 The IMF paper recommends crafting such clauses to
ensure that issuers are not required to pay creditors on an equal or
ratable basis. The paper recommends additional contractual reforms
in the form of enhanced CACs that “include a more robust
‘aggregation’ feature to address collective action problems more
effectively.”57
While these methods would take time to implement and likely
would not demonstrate much impact for years to come, they are a
superior route to addressing the problem of sovereign debt
54. ICMA Sovereign Bond Consultation Paper, INT’L CAPITAL MARKET ASS’N
(Dec. 2013), http://www.icmagroup.org/resources/Sovereign-Debt-Information/.
55. Sovereign Debt Restructuring – Recent Developments and Implications for
the Fund’s Legal and Policy Framework, INT’L MONETARY FUND (Apr. 26, 2013),
https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/042613.pdf;
Strengthening the Contractual Framework to Address Collective Action Problems
in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, INT’L MONETARY FUND (Oct. 2014),
http://www.imf.org/external/pp/longres.aspx?id=4911.
56. Strengthening the Contractual Framework to Address Collective Action
Problems in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, INT’L MONETARY FUND (Oct. 2014),
http://www.imf.org/external/pp/longres.aspx?id=4911.
57. Id.; see also Press Release, INT’L MONETARY FUND, Executive Board
Discusses Strengthening the Contractual Framework in Sovereign Debt
Restructuring, No. 14/459 (Oct. 6, 2014),
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2014/pr14459.htm.
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restructuring than application of Argentina’s flawed claim to
sovereign immunity. The problem of a lack of international regime
to handle sovereign debt crises likely will and should be addressed
through application of economic policy, international negotiation,
treaty, contract clause, and various other methods that avoid creating
a host of new problems by undermining the FSIA, the legitimacy of
U.S. court judgments, and fundamental discovery rules while
simultaneously discouraging foreign investment in a system where
investors cannot rely on their contractual agreements or the rule of
law.
V.

CONCLUSION

While the international financial community continues to face
the problem of increasing numbers of defaulting states without any
rules or overarching regime to govern these crises, Argentina v. NML
Capital was not the appropriate venue for resolving the many issues
surrounding sovereign default. Rather, under the circumstances of
this case, had the Supreme Court allowed Argentina to circumvent
the strict reading of the FSIA based on its foreign policy arguments,
it would not have protected investor-state relations or strengthened
the international arbitration and litigation regimes: it would have
undermined those processes. Future sovereign debtors are not left
without recourse by the Court’s decision. Instead, states may begin
to adopt stronger, more effectively-crafted collective action clauses
and other contractual terms when issuing sovereign debt. The
Court’s refusal to create an exception for sovereign debtors may also
lead to renewed discussions of a sovereign debt restructuring
mechanism. Those avenues represent more sound solutions that will
neither undermine national and international legal principles nor
trigger a host of unintended, negative consequences for the rule of
law and the international marketplace.

